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Abstract: 
In this paper idiosyncratic uncertainty is introduced in a model of economic growth with 
an increasing variety of intermediate products. Both the costs of producing intermediate 
products and their quality are uncertain for all producers at all times. Using the property 
of the model that the number of intermediate firms is infinite, uncertainty cancels out in 
the aggregate. Furthermore, the magnitude of uncertainty has several deterministic effects 
on long-term economic growth. First, uncertainty causes growth in the heterogeneity of 
intermediate firms. As heterogeneity grows, the number of very efficient intermediate 
firms increases. Depending on the degree of competition and the returns to intermediate 
products, these firms can attract an increasing share of demand by the final sector. This 
makes final production become more efficient over time. Second, uncertainty changes the 
rate at which new intermediates are introduced by its effect on the efficiency of final 
production and by a real-option effect. 
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1 Introduction
Uncertainty plays an important part in many types of decisions, trivial or not, in probably every
Þrm and household. It is therefore somewhat surprising that the study of the relations between
uncertainty and economic growth has been limited to the domain of household saving behavior.
The implications of uncertainty for the performance of Þrms have largely been ignored in the
growth literature (see section 2). This paper attempts to Þll this gap by combining two basic
ideas - namely that uncertainty both creates opportunities and makes people reluctant to decide
- in a model of economic growth.
In this paper uncertainty is introduced in a model with increasing variety of intermediate
products that is similar to that of Romer (1990). The model consists of three sectors of produc-
tion. First, the consumption goods sector uses human capital, raw labor, and intermediates.
Second, intermediate goods are produced with physical capital. Third, the research sector pro-
duces designs for new types of intermediate goods, also with the use of human capital. The
eﬃciency of the research sector depends on the level of knowledge, which is equivalent to the
number of intermediates. Consumers are assumed to spread their consumption evenly over time
(Ramsey consumers). Long-term growth is made possible because of constant returns to the
production of new designs.
Idiosyncratic uncertainty is introduced at the Þrm-level in the intermediate sector. Both
the costs and quality of intermediate products are made uncertain for all producers at all times.
In the model all distributions are known in advance and no subjective probability eﬀects are
present. Furthermore, uncertainty is measured by the variance in the change of the quality and
cost parameters. This makes forecasts over a long period less precise than forecasts regarding
the immediate future. Also, the variance of the levels of these parameters across Þrms is
expected to grow over time.
How does the introduction of uncertainty aﬀect the model? The intermediate sector is
characterized by monopolistic competition. Suppose that, in case of certainty, all intermediate
producers are equally eﬃcient and equally proÞtable. They all have the same costs of produc-
tion, and they all can sell the same amount of goods at identical prices. The introduction of
Þrm-level uncertainty in quality and costs necessarily breaks down this symmetry as diﬀerent
Þrms have diﬀerent fortunes. Lucky Þrms are (temporarily) able to produce better products
at lower costs, while unlucky Þrms (temporarily) produce inferior products at high costs. This
makes the Þnal goods sector to shift its demand for intermediates from unlucky Þrms to lucky
Þrms. By doing so, the Þnal goods sector can increase its output above the maximum level
attainable without uncertainty. The size of this substitution-eﬀect naturally depends on the
degree of competition between intermediate producers.
Uncertainty, however, also may reduce the eﬃciency of Þnal output production. Because
of diminishing returns to intermediate inputs, an increase in the quality (decrease in marginal
costs) of an intermediate leads to a smaller absolute change in the demand for the intermediate
than a decrease in quality (increase in marginal costs) of the same size does. Final output is
a concave function of intermediate inputs and therefore, by Jensens Inequality, the expected
level of Þnal production is negatively related with uncertainty (see appendix C on Jensens
Inequality). The relation between output and intermediate uncertainty depends on which eﬀect
is larger, the substitution-eﬀect or the diminishing returns to intermediates eﬀect.
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This does not explain why uncertainty might aﬀect long-term growth. Rather it seems to
point at a relation between uncertainty and the level of Þnal output. As the level of uncertainty
is approximated by the variance of the changes in quality or costs, the presence of uncertainty
makes the diﬀerences between Þrms grow over time. Thus, although the variance of the changes
in quality or costs is constant, the variance of quality and cost characteristics across Þrms does
grow over time. This makes both the substitution-eﬀect and the diminishing returns eﬀect
grow over time. If the substitution-eﬀect is larger than the diminishing returns eﬀect, then the
growth rate of output depends positively on the level of intermediate uncertainty. In the model
presented here, the number of intermediate Þrms is inÞnite. This property ensures that neither
uncertainty in quality nor costs will lead to uncertainty in the aggregate.
Uncertainty in the intermediate sector does not only aﬀect Þnal output, it also has conse-
quences for the research sector. The price of a new design for an intermediate product depends
on the proÞts that the production of the intermediate is expected to generate. Uncertainty
in quality and costs makes these proÞts uncertain as well. For the entrepreneur that wishes
to set up a new intermediate Þrm, the purchase of a design is an irreversible investment with
uncertain returns. Therefore, the entrepreneur will tend to wait before she purchases a new
design as valuable information becomes available over time. Uncertainty increases the value of
waiting when decisions are costly to reverse. This is known as the real-option eﬀect (e.g. Dixit
and Pindyck 1994).
Postponement, however, is not eﬃcient for the research sector. Under some assumptions
about the structure of the market for designs, the price of a design in the presence of uncertainty
will be deterministic and will be less than the discounted sum of expected proÞts. Whether or
not an increase in uncertainty will make the price of designs to rise or to fall depends on whether
the decrease in the price due to the real-option eﬀect is larger than the (possible) increase in
the price induced by higher expected proÞts caused by more uncertainty. If the real-option
eﬀect is dominant, then the low price for designs reduces the wage rate of human capital in the
research sector and leads to a shift of human capital from the research sector to the Þnal goods
sector. Long-term growth will in this case be lower when uncertainty increases as less resources
are devoted to knowledge accumulation.
The overall impact of uncertainty on growth will depend on which of the discussed eﬀects will
be the strongest. If the substitution eﬀect dominates the diminishing returns to intermediate
inputs eﬀect then growth is stimulated through continuing improvements in the eﬃciency of Þnal
production. The corresponding rise in expected proÞts will further stimulate growth through
its encouragement of the introduction of new intermediates. On the other hand, the real-option
eﬀect slows down growth through its depressing eﬀect on the introduction of new intermediate
products. As opposed to the situation under certainty, the growth of the number of intermediate
Þrms is not the sole engine of economic growth after the introduction of uncertainty.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a brief survey of the theoretical liter-
ature on uncertainty and economic growth. Section 3 gives an overview of the most relevant
empirical publications. In section 4, a model of endogenous growth with micro-uncertainty is
presented. Section 5 deals with the long-term eﬀects of uncertainty on growth. An interpreta-
tion of the results can be found in section 6. Section 7 brießy discusses how the Þndings may
relate to economic policy. The paper ends with some concluding remarks.
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2 Theoretical literature
Does uncertainty aﬀect economic growth, or not? In order to answer this question, the literature
on economic growth has primarily focussed on how uncertainty aﬀects savings. Mirman (1971,
p.179) observes that
(...) two divergent forces are at work. The Þrst is the desire to consume more
initially as a hedge against the uncertain future. The second force is the desire to
consume less initially so as to increase the future consumption prospects.
Early contributions on savings and uncertainty are Phelps (1962), Levhari and Srinivasan
(1969), and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971). A change in savings has an impact on (short-term)
economic growth. Brock and Mirman (1972) were the Þrst to publish a model of economic
growth under uncertainty.1
Most models that aim to explain the implications of uncertainty for long-term economic
growth also rely on the eﬀect of uncertainty on savings. Jones, Manuelli, and Stacchetti (1999)
Þnd a small positive relation between uncertainty and growth using a simulation model. De Hek
(1999) introduces uncertainty into the endogenous growth models of Lucas (1988) and Romer
(1986). In the Þrst case, he Þnds that as uncertainty in the productivity of knowledge creation
makes people less willing to invest in knowledge creation, long-term growth is negatively aﬀected
by uncertainty.
In the case of Romer (1986), De Hek shows that the eﬀect of uncertainty on growth depends
on the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to time. Precautionary savings lead to a
higher investment rate, while hedging reduces the rate of investment. The Solow-Swan model
suggests that the savings rate does not aﬀect the growth rate. Romer, however, links knowledge
to capital accumulation. As a result, savings do have an eﬀect on long-term growth.
All these studies were concerned with the eﬀects of disturbances in aggregate variables on
savings and growth. An exception to this pattern is Bertola (1994). He presents an endoge-
nous growth model with Þrm-level uncertainty that does not rely on a savings-eﬀect. Instead,
uncertainty reduces the returns to investment because it is costly for Þrms to adjust their
workforce.
In Schumpeterian theories of growth, uncertainty and growth are usually not related directly.
Rather, uncertainty and growth are both the result of innovation and consequentially they will
occur simultaneously. Grossman and Helpman (1991) presented a quality-ladder model where
stochastic quality improvements at the level of the Þrm result in a constant aggregate growth
rate. Aghion and Howitt (1992) propose a model of creative destruction with uncertainty in
aggregate growth rates.
Another strand of literature focussed on the relation between uncertainty and economic
development. Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) argued that development of the Þnancial sector
increases the possibilities for diversiÞcation and encourages economic growth by reducing the
costs of investing. As economies develop they become more stable. Acemoglu and Zilibotti
1They refer to an unpublished paper by J.A. Mirrlees, titled: Optimum allocation under uncertainty from
1965 as being the Þrst paper on this subject.
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(1997) emphasize that the number of activities of a (closed) economy tends to grow with
development. They also arrive at the result that development fosters stability and vice versa.
In all of the literature mentioned above (with the exception of Bertola 1994), micro-uncertainty
is not considered to be important as long as it does not cause disturbances in aggregate vari-
ables. The model presented in this paper is about an economy that is already at the stage of full
diversiÞcation. However, uncertainty at the micro-level is shown to be still relevant to long-term
growth. Diminishing returns to capital, imperfect competition, and irreversible investments all
have implications for the relation between uncertainty and growth.
3 Empirical literature
I am not aware of any empirical studies on the relation between micro-uncertainty and growth.
The literature on aggregate volatility and growth has to be used as a substitute. In any economy
that is not fully diversiÞed, micro-level volatility will work through in the aggregate. Studies on
aggregate volatility therefore might seriously underestimate how growth is related to volatility.
In the Þrst publications on the subject (a cross-section study by Kormendi and Meguire
(1985) and pooled estimation by Grier and Tullock (1989)) it was concluded that growth and
volatility are positively related. Using more sophisticated methods and panel data, Ramey and
Ramey (1995) Þnd a negative relation in both the full sample and the OECD sub-sample. Using
similar methods, Aizenman and Marion (1999) Þnd a negative relation for developing countries.
Caporale and McKiernan (1996, 1998) Þnd that growth is positively related to volatility. They
used ARCH estimation on time series from the United States and the United Kingdom.
A more subtle, and probably more informative, approach is to consider the relation between
investment and volatility. Ramey and Ramey (1995) do not Þnd a relation between total
aggregate investment and volatility. This result is conÞrmed by Aizenman and Marion (1999).
However, Aizenman and Marion also Þnd that private investment is clearly negatively related
to volatility, whereas government investment is slightly positively related to volatility.
This conÞrms the results from micro-level and sectorial studies. The negative relation
between irreversible investment that is predicted by real-option theory (see for example Dixit
and Pindyck 1994) is supported by the majority of empirical studies conducted with sectorial
and Þrm-level data (for a survey see Carruth, Dickerson, and Henley 2000). In particular, Goel
and Ram (2001) Þnd that the relation between expenditure on R&D and volatility is more
negative than that between ordinary investment and volatility.
Given the dominant role of uncertainty in many decision making processes in many Þrms, it
is surprising that empirical studies do not Þnd major implications of uncertainty for economic
growth. The model in this paper suggests that this might be due to eﬀects that work in opposite
directions.
4 A model of growth with micro-uncertainty
Uncertainty is introduced both in the quality of intermediate products and in the costs of
producing them. The demand for intermediate products comes from the Þnal goods sector.
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The production function of the Þnal goods sector is given by
Y = H1−α−βY L
β
Z A
0
(θixi)
α di . (1)
Here, Y represents the output of the Þnal goods sector, HY is the amount of human capital
used for the production of Þnal goods, L is unskilled labor, xi (i ∈ A) is the quantity of
intermediate good i that is used for the production of Y , θi is its quality, and A is the number
of intermediates.
The quality parameter, θi, is a stochastic variable that is speciÞc to each intermediate
product and that changes over time. This variable is assumed to follow a geometric Brownian
motion of the form
θiT = exp
·
ln θi0 +
Z T
0
d lnθit
¸
d lnθit =
·µ
mθ − 1
2
σ2θ
¶
dt+ σθdzθ,it
¸
dzθ,it = ²θ,it
√
dt .
Here, mθ− 12σ2θ is the drift rate of the process, dt is a small increment in time, σ2θ is the variance
of d ln θ, zθ,it is a Wiener process, and ²θ,it is a normally distributed random variable with mean
zero and variance unity.
It is more convenient to work with changes in θ in stead of ln θ. Applying Itôs lemma to
dθ = d (exp [ln θ]) gives
dθ =
∂ exp [ln θ]
∂ ln θ
d lnθ +
1
2
∂2 exp [ln θ]
∂ (ln θ)2
(d lnθ)2
= θd ln θ +
1
2
θ (d lnθ)2
= θ
µ
mθ − 1
2
σ2θ
¶
dt+ θσθdzθ +
1
2
θσ2θdt ,
where all orders of dt larger than one are ignored and dz2 = dt.2 The variable θ can conveniently
be written as an Itô process of the form
θiT = θi0 +
Z T
0
dθit (2)
dθit = mθθitdt+ σθθitdzθ,it . (3)
Four remarks about this stochastic process are in place. First, a Brownian motion with a drift
is the limit of a random walk with uneven probabilities for negative and positive changes.3
A positive drift implies that positive changes are more likely to occur than negative changes.
The drift rate thus represents the bias of uncertainty. Second, notice that when a geometric
2As dt→ 0, dt > dt3/2 ≈ 0.
3See for example Dixit (1993).
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Brownian motion has a positive initial value, it will never become negative as θ = 0 is an
absorbing barrier. Third, the integral in 2 is an Itô integral, which implies that4
hθiT it = θit exp [mθ (T − t)] . (4)
Here, the hooks are expected value operators. If one would require that, a priori, uncertainty
is unbiased, then one could simply set mθ = 0.5 In the model presented here, no restrictions
are placed on the a priori bias of uncertainty. A priori unbiased uncertainty is just a special
case. The fourth and last remark concerns the variance of θ. As θ is lognormally distributed¡
θt ∼ LN
£¡
mθ − 12σ2θ
¢
(T − t) , σ2θ (T − t)
¤¢
, the variance of θ is6
V (θiT )t = θ2it exp [2mθ (T − t)]
¡
exp
£
σ2θ (T − t)
¤− 1¢ . (5)
The variance of θ is expected to grow over time and accelerate with increases in mθ or σθ. This
implies that the diﬀerences between Þrms are expected to widen over time.
In the model each unit of the intermediate product of variety i is produced with η units
of foregone consumption K (capital). It is assumed that capital can be reallocated among
the intermediate Þrms instantly and without costs. When xi denotes the quantity produced
of variety i and r is the interest rate then the costs of producing this quantity are rηxi. The
cost parameter, η, is not a constant but a variable that changes randomly over time and that
is diﬀerent for each variety i. More speciÞc, it is assumed that ηi also follows a geometric
Brownian motion.
ηiT = ηi0 +
Z T
0
dηit (6)
dηit = mηηitdt+ σηηitdzη,it (7)
dzη,it = ²η,it
√
dt .
The expected value and variance of ηiT are
hηiT it = ηit exp [mη (T − t)] (8)
V (ηiT )t = η2it exp [2mη (T − t)]
¡
exp
£
σ2η (T − t)
¤− 1¢ . (9)
The diﬀerences between the cost characteristics of Þrms are expected to change over time.
Equations 3 and 7 are examples of Itô stochastic diﬀerential equations (SDEs). To allow dθit
4If limn→∞
Pn
ν=0 θ (τν) (z (tν+1)− z (tν)) =
R
dθitdi and τν = atν+1 + (1− a) tν then Itô integrals have
a = 0. As a result θ (τν) is independent of z (tν+1).
5Note that deÞning the drift rate of d ln θ asmθ− 12σ2θ neutralizes the part of the drift rate that is endogenous
to the geometric Brownian motion.
6The variance of the increments in the logarithm of θ is given by
V (d ln θ) =
D
(d ln θ)2
E
− hd ln θi2 = σ2θdt .
Over period [t, T ] this implies V (∆ ln θ) = σ2θ∆t = σ2θ (T − t). For properties of the lognormal distribution see
e.g. Aitchison and Brown (1957).
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and dηit to be stochastically related it is assumed that the joint distribution of ²θ and ²η is
given by
(²θ,it, ²η,it) ∼ N2 [0, 0, 1, 1, µ]
with |µ| < 1
The parameter µ denotes the correlation between ²θ,it and ²η,it. Furthermore, the covariances
across time and Þrms are assumed to be zero. A negative µ means that a decrease in costs is
likely to coincide with an increase in quality. A positive µ implies that lower costs are likely to
occur at the same time as lower quality.
The research sector produces designs by means of human capital (HA) and available knowl-
edge (or stock of designs, A). Human capital is thus employed in both the Þnal and research
sector. Total human capital is H = HY + HA. Suppose that the probability that one person
makes a discovery between t and t+dt is λ and each discovery will lead to δA new designs. As
the knowledge base increases, discoveries become more fruitful. Thus, the number of discovered
designs is a Poisson process with ßow probability λ and jumps of the size δA. The number of
new designs researcher h ∈ HA is expected to generate is
hdAhi = δAλdt .
The variance of the number of newly produced designs is
V (dAh) = δAλdt .
The total amount of designs discovered by the research sector between t and t+ dt is
úA =
Z HA
0
λδAdh
= λδAHA , (10)
where the dot represents the derivative with respect to time. An increase in λ implies an
increase in the variance of dAh and thus more uncertainty for the individual researcher. The
uncertainty experienced by researchers is extremely biased: the probability of undiscovering a
design is zero, while the probability of discovering a design is positive. For researchers more
uncertainty directly implies higher productivity.
4.1 Downstream impact of uncertainty
The producer of intermediate goods of variety i is able to set a mark-up over its marginal costs
because of the limited substitutability of intermediates implied by the additive production
function of the consumption goods sector. The price of intermediate i is
p¯i =
rηi
α
. (11)
The implied inverse demand function for xi is
pi = αH
1−α−β
Y L
βθαi x
α−1
i . (12)
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By equating demand and supply, the produced amount of intermediate i can be constructed:
x¯i =
³
α−2rηiH
α+β−1
Y L
−βθ−αi
´ 1
α−1
. (13)
ProÞts for p¯ and x¯ are given by7
πi = (1− α)α 1+αα−1 r αα−1H
α+β−1
α−1
Y L
−β
α−1θ
−α
α−1
i η
α
α−1
i . (14)
Inserting x¯i from 13 into the production function gives
Y = H
α+β−1
α−1
Y L
−β
α−1 r
α
α−1α
−2α
α−1
Z A
0
θ
−α
α−1
i η
α
α−1
i di . (15)
Although the ηi and θi are stochastic, it can be shown that
R A
0
θ
−α
α−1
i η
α
α−1
i di can be expressed as
a simple deterministic function.
Proposition 1 Suppose that the following conditions hold
(1) intermediate Þrms started at t = 0 have identical quality and cost characteristics (∀i ∈
A0 : θi0 = θ0 and ηi0 = η0)
(2) intermediate Þrms started at t > 0 are as proÞtable as existing Þrms are on average
(∀i ∈ [At, At+dt) : πit = π¯t)
(3) the number of intermediate Þrms (At) changes deterministically over time
then
R A
0
θ
−α
α−1
i η
α
α−1
i di can be expressed as the deterministic expression
Atθ
k
0η
−k
0 exp [κt] (16)
with
κ ≡ kmθ + 1
2
k (k − 1) σ2θ − kmη +
1
2
k (k + 1) σ2η − k22σθσηµ (17)
and k ≡ −α
α−1 > 0.
Proof. See subsection A.1.
Using 16 in 15 and taking growth rates yields
Y =
α+ β − 1
α− 1
HY +
−β
α− 1
L+
α
α− 1r + κ+
A (18)
The eﬀect of uncertainty on the growth rate of Þnal output is ambiguous. The second term of
17 shows that if α < 1
2
, an increase in the uncertainty parameter for quality (σθ) will reduce κ
even if µ = 0. The eﬀect of more uncertainty in costs (ση) is positive, at least for µ ≤ 0.
7The ßow of proÞts for intermediate Þrm i is πi = (1− α) p¯ix¯i with the price as a mark-up over marginal
costs, p¯i = rηi/α, and the quantity implied by the price and the demand function (13).
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4.2 Upstream impact of uncertainty
Before an entrepreneur can start producing a certain type of intermediate good, the entrepreneur
has to buy a design from the research sector. The price of a particular design is set by the
research sector and is assumed not to change after it has been set. Furthermore, it is assumed
that each design can only be bought by one speciÞc entrepreneur. Unlike in the Romer model,
there is no competition for designs. The entrepreneur thus can only decide when to buy the
design, that is, if the entrepreneur buys it at all. These rather restrictive assumptions are
necessary to introduce a real-option eﬀect without adding much complexity.8
Before an entrepreneur decides to buy a design, she would like to know how much it is likely
to be worth. The value of a new design depends on the ßow of proÞts an intermediate Þrm is
expected to generate. If an intermediate Þrm is faced with uncertainty in quality and costs,
what are the implications for the value of the Þrm? It will be shown in section 5 that r and
HY are constant if the market for human capital clears instantly. Therefore, equation 14 can
be simpliÞed to
πi = Γθ
k
i η
−k
i (19)
where Γ is a constant. This expression for proÞts can be used to describe the behavior of the
expected value of a project, hV i.
Proposition 2 If π is represented by 19, the conditions of proposition 1 hold, and the rate of
interest, r, is constant over time, then hV i is a stochastic process with initial value
hVA (t)i = 1
r − κΓθ
k
0η
−k
0 exp [κt] (20)
and SDE d hV i = hV i (κdt+ kσθdzθ − kσηdzη).
Proof. See subsection A.2.
The eﬀect of uncertainty on the growth rate of proÞts is ambiguous. In fact, it is identical
to the downstream eﬀect of uncertainty on the growth rate of Þnal output. Again, the second
term of 17 shows that if α < 1
2
, an increase in the uncertainty parameter for quality (σθ) will
reduce κ even if µ = 0. The eﬀect of more uncertainty in costs is positive, at least for µ ≤ 0.
From the proof of proposition 2 follows that if η and θ follow a geometrical Brownian motion,
so does hV i. Following the literature on real options, entrepreneurs may postpone irreversible
investment when the revenues from the investment are uncertain.9 In this model there is an
occurrence of irreversible investment: intermediate producers have to pay a lump sum in order
to get a design. Given the price of the design set by the research sector, the entrepreneur has to
decide whether she will buy the design now or later. Postponing the investment can be a wise
thing to do for two reasons. First, the expected value of a project may rise (deterministically)
over time. Second, valuable information about the levels of ηi and θi becomes available over
time, thus increasing the returns to waiting.
8Real-option eﬀects can also occur in more competitive settings. See Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, chapters 8
and 9 for examples.
9For an overview of real-option theory see Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
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From now on it is assumed that uncertainty in quality and costs is external to the Þrm.
Both θi and ηi are observable stochastic variables precisely from the moment that design i has
been invented. Without this assumption entrepreneurs would be indiﬀerent about the timing
of the purchase of designs.
The conditions under which investing is optimal are given by the application of real-option
theory. In short, the procedure is to derive the value of the opportunity to invest. Investment
is optimal when the opportunity to invest is as valuable as investing now. In this situation the
entrepreneur is indiﬀerent between waiting and investing. As the opportunity to invest cannot
be less valuable than investing now, investment is optimal at the point of indiﬀerence between
waiting and investing.
The value of the opportunity to invest (F ) is given by
F (V ) = max
T
£
(VT − PA) e−rT
¤
. (21)
Where PA is the irreversible investment which is the price of a design, and T is the unknown
time at which the investment is made. The value of the opportunity to invest is equal to the
discounted value of the investment project started at the optimal time. At this point in time
(T ∗) the opportunity to invest is equal to the value of investing immediately
F (V ) = VT ∗ − PA , (22)
so there is no gain from postponing the investment (the option to postpone is worthless). The
value of V at T ∗ will be denoted as V ∗. In order to Þnd the value of V ∗, the value of the
option to invest, represented by F (V ), has to be determined. The Þrst step here is to write an
expression for the behavior of F over time:
rFdt = hdF i . (23)
This equation is called a Bellman equation. This equation can be shown to result from 21.
Intuitively 23 can be interpreted as follows: Would the option to invest have been tradable and
its risk diversiÞable, then the value of the option would have to increase over time (hdF i /dt) in
such a way that it makes up for the foregone revenues from interest (rF ). We can obtain hdF i
by using Itôs lemma, substituting for dV from equation 21 and taking the expected value
hdF i = FV κV dt+ 1
2
FV V V
2k2
¡
σ2θ + σ
2
η − 2σθσηµ
¢
dt . (24)
Insert this into the Bellman equation (23) and divide through dt to obtain the diﬀerential
equation
1
2
FV V V
2k2
¡
σ2θ + σ
2
η − 2σθσηµ
¢
+ FV κV − rF (V ) = 0 . (25)
When Vt = 0 it will keep this value forever because Vt follows a geometric Brownian motion.
Thus, as the opportunity to invest in something that will never be valuable is worthless, the
diﬀerential equation must satisfy
F (0) = 0 . (26)
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Also, from equation 22 follows
F (V ∗) = V ∗ − PA . (27)
A third, and last, requirement, called the smooth-pasting condition, is
FV (V
∗) = 1 . (28)
Smooth pasting is necessary because when F = V − PA but hdF i /dt 6= dV/dt, then the
entrepreneur would not be indiﬀerent between investing and postponing.
F (V ) can be found by solving the second order linear diﬀerential equation 25 using equations
26, 27, and 28. As F (0) = 0 we know that F should have the following form:
F (V ) = B1V
b1 +B2V
b2 .
Using this in equation 25 gives
BV b
·
1
2
k2
¡
σ2θ + σ
2
η − 2σθσηµ
¢
b2 + κb− r
¸
= 0
The fundamental quadratic equation to be solved is
Q (b) = 1
2
k2
¡
σ2θ + σ
2
η − 2σθσηµ
¢
b2 + κb− r = 0
b =
−κ±
q
κ2 + 2k2
¡
σ2θ + σ
2
η − 2σθσηµ
¢
r
k2
¡
σ2θ + σ
2
η − 2σθσηµ
¢
Here, b must be larger than zero because the value of the option cannot decrease with an
increase in the underlying value. The only possible solution is F (V ) = B1V b1 with
b1 =
−κ+
q
κ2 + 2k2
¡
σ2θ + σ
2
η − 2σθσηµ
¢
r
k2
¡
σ2θ + σ
2
η − 2σθσηµ
¢ . (29)
The equations 27 and 28 give a formulation for V ∗ and B1:
V ∗ =
b1
b1 − 1PA (30)
B1 =
V ∗ − PA
(V ∗)b1
=
(b1 − 1)b1−1
bb1P b1−1A
From 30 it is clear that b1 > 1 has to be satisÞed otherwise the intermediate Þrm would
invest while the value of the investment is negative and its price is positive. This implies that
µ <
¡
σ2θ + σ
2
η
¢
/ (2σθση), which is always satisÞed as µ < 1.
What, however, will be the price of a new design? The research sector will set a price to
maximize expected revenues. Suppose that the research sector does not engage in a dynamic
pricing strategy and sets only one intertemporal price for each new design. The higher the price
is set, the longer it is expected to take before the intermediate producer buys the design.
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Proposition 3 If the research sector can set the price of a design only once, then the research
sector will always sell designs immediately after their discovery.
Proof. See subsection A.3.
The price at which newly discovered design are sold is
P ∗A(t) =
b1 − 1
b1
VAt . (31)
Note that no uncertainty about P ∗A or the time of transaction is left when the research sector
decides to set the price in order to sell immediately. In fact, the price of new designs changes
deterministically over time. That the time of transaction is not stochastic follows from the
assumption that designs are sold at a Þxed price. That P ∗A is not stochastic follows from the
assumption that the initial proÞtability of a new design is equal to the average proÞtability at
that time (condition 2 of proposition 1). All uncertainty is thus transmitted to the intermediate
producer.
The assumption that the research sector sets a Þxed price for a new design is less restrictive
than it may appear to be. In fact, P ∗A has an alternative interpretation. Notice that P
∗
A is the
highest price for which both the research sector and the intermediate producer are not willing
to postpone the transaction. P ∗A could be the outcome of a dynamic waiting game. Suppose
the research sector sets PA = Vt. Now, the intermediate producer can exploit the incentive of
the research sector to sell immediately by threatening to postpone the acquisition of the new
design. The intermediate producer can only do this in a credible way until the price has dropped
to P ∗A because at P
∗
A it is not optimal anymore for the intermediate producer to postpone.
How will less uncertainty, that is a decrease in σθ and ση, aﬀect the price for a business plan,
PA? Suppose that σθ,ση → 0, then from equation 29 it follows that b1 →∞, and together with
lim
b1→∞
b1 − 1
b1
= 1 , (32)
it implies that
lim
σθ,ση→0
PA(t) = lim
b1→∞
b1 − 1
b1
VA,t = VA,t .
The research sector receives a low price for designs when there is a lot of uncertainty in the
value of the designs.
The expected income of the entrepreneur becomes positive as proÞts become uncertain as
the negotiating power of the entrepreneur increases. Although being rewarded for taking risks
seems to be a realistic feature of the model, it brings along two problems. First, there is the
problem of the scarcity of entrepreneurial capability. When selling a design, the research sector
is confronted with a scarcity of entrepreneurs. There is only one entrepreneur that is willing to
buy the design. On the other hand, it is always possible to Þnd a capable entrepreneur. The
capability of prospective entrepreneurs is not aﬀected by the number of designs that have been
sold previously. This points at the presence of an abundance of entrepreneurs. The paradox can
be resolved by assuming that good entrepreneurs are abundant but also extremely heterogenous.
These assumptions, however, are not very realistic.
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The second problem concerns the distribution of entrepreneurial income. How does uncer-
tainty about the income of an individual relate to aggregate consumer behavior? One solution
here is to assume that entrepreneurs trade shares in their Þrms with each other. By doing so
they can obtain a riskless portfolio of shares. In this case the entrepreneur is rewarded not for
taking risks but rather for possessing and using unique talents.
5 Long-term growth
Both the downstream and upstream eﬀects of uncertainty in the intermediate sector were shown
to be deterministic (see equations 18 and 31). Thus, the long-term growth rate can be deter-
mined in approximately the same way as in the model by Romer (1990). First, determine
the equilibrium share of human capital employed by the research sector. Second, the resulting
share gives the growth rate of the number of intermediate Þrms. Third, the growth in the Þnal
production and other variables are determined.
To get the share of human capital in the Þnal goods sector, the wage rate of human capital
has to be found. This can be done by setting the wage rate of the Þnal goods sector equal to
the wage rate in the research sector (wHY = wHA). In both sectors, the wage rate equals the
marginal productivity of human capital. For the research sector, the marginal productivity of
human capital is (using equations 31, 20, and 14)
wHA,t =
d
dHA
PA úA =
d
dHA
PAλδAHA
= α
−1−α
α−1 r
α
α−1H
α+β−1
α−1
Y L
−β
α−1 b1−1
b1
1
r−κθ
k
0η
−k
0 exp [κt]λδA
(33)
Using 16 in 15 we see that the wage rate for human capital in the Þnal goods sector is
wHY ,t =
1− α− β
1− α H
α+β−1
α−1 −1
Y L
−β
α−1 r
α
α−1α
−2α
α−1Aθk0η
−k
0 exp [κt] (34)
The amount of human capital employed in the Þnal goods sector can be found by equating
equations 33 and 34 and solving for HY
wHA = wHY
HY =
b1
(b1 − 1)
(1− α− β) (r − κ)
(1− α)λδα . (35)
From 35 follows that HY can only be constant if r = 0 (at least for HY < H). That the interest
rate is indeed constant when the market for human capital is in equilibrium can be shown by
equating the growth rates of the productivity of human capital in both sectors:
wHA = wHY
κ+ A− α
α−1r −
úr
r − κ = κ+
A− α
α−1r
úr = 0 . (36)
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Thus, the allocation of human capital between the Þnal goods and research sector is constant
(remember that there is no uncertainty in the aggregate). Consequently, the growth rate of A
is constant.
A = λδHA = λδ
·
H − b1
(b1 − 1)
(1− α− β) (r − κ)
(1− α)λδα
¸
= λδH + Λ (κ− r) , (37)
with
Λ ≡ b1
(b1 − 1)
(1− α− b)
(1− α)α . (38)
Combining equation 18 with L = HY = r = 0 gives the growth rate of income:
Y = κ+ A . (39)
The amount of capital that is used in the economy consists of two components. First, capital
is used for the production of intermediate goods. Second, capital is needed to be able to pay
directly for the services of the research sector. The research sector has to be paid instantly
by the intermediate Þrm but this Þrm cannot recover these costs instantly. Therefore, the
intermediate Þrm has to get a loan to Þnance the gap in cash-ßows. The total amount of
capital is the sum of the capital used in intermediate production and the capital needed to
Þnance the cash-ßow gap of the intermediate sector (D)
Kt =
Z A
0
ηitx¯itdi+Dt , (40)
where xit is given by equation 13 and thus ηitx¯it = Ξθ
k
itη
−k
it , with Ξ ≡ (1−α−β)
−2
α−1 r
1
α−1H
α+β−1
α−1
Y L
−β
α−1 .
The growth rate of
R A
0
Ξθki η
−k
i di is A+ κ (proposition 1).
Proposition 4 If the ratio of debt repayment to proÞts is b1−1
b1
, then K = A+ κ.
Proof. See subsection A.4.
As C
Y
= 1− úK
Y
= 1− KK
Y
, which implies C − Y = bK + K − Y , and K = Y , we have
C = K .
The long-term growth rate of the economy, γ, is
γ = A+ κ = λδH + Λ (κ− r) + κ. (41)
Intertemporal optimization of the utility function implies that C = (r − ρ) /s.10 Solving for the
interest rate yields
r =
s (λδH + (Λ+ 1) κ) + ρ
sΛ+ 1
. (42)
10The utility function is given by
R∞
0 U (C) exp [−ρt] dt where U (C) = C
1−s−1
1−s and s ≥ 0 and is optimized
subject to úK = Y −C and limt→∞Kt exp [−rt] ≥ 0.
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Note that because total capital requirements are deterministic, the interest rate is the risk-free.
After substitution of 42 in 41 we Þnd
γ =
λδH + (Λ+ 1) κ− ρΛ
sΛ+ 1
. (43)
Equations 17, 32, and 38 show that for σθ, ση → 0, λ = 1, and mη = mθ = 0 we get the
results identical to that of Romer (1990).
6 Interpretation of the model
How does uncertainty aﬀect growth? After inserting 38 into 43,
γ =
λδH + (κ− ρ) b1
(b1−1)
(1−α−β)
(1−α)α + κ
s b1
(b1−1)
(1−α−β)
(1−α)α + 1
, (44)
it becomes clear that the equation for growth contains three parameters that are related to
uncertainty: λ, κ, and b1. As has been explained in section 4, a higher λ means both more
uncertainty and higher productivity in the research sector. Not surprisingly, λ is directly and
positively related to the growth rate. The κ stands for the aggregate of Jensens Inequality
eﬀects (see next subsection and appendix C). The b1 originates from the investment-timing
eﬀect (subsection 4.2).
6.1 The intermediate sector
The demand for a high-quality low-cost intermediate will be larger than the demand for an infe-
rior and more expensive intermediate. Suppose the eﬃciency-measure of raw capital devoted
to intermediate i is deÞned as θi/ηi then a rise in the eﬃciency-measure of the intermediate
leads to a rise in demand for the intermediate for two reasons. First, for given input expenditure
shares, more Þnal goods can be produced with the same amount of resources (a direct produc-
tivity eﬀect). Second, the demand of the Þnal goods sector shifts from the other intermediates
towards the more eﬃcient intermediate (a substitution eﬀect). The demand of the intermediate
sector for capital will shift accordingly.
Whether an increase in the eﬃciency-measure of an intermediate causes Þnal production
to rise or to fall depends on how much the productivity of an intermediate decreases when
more of it is used. If returns to intermediate inputs are sharply decreasing, then both the direct
productivity and the substitution eﬀect will be small. The direct productivity eﬀect will be small
because for given expenditure shares, a rise in the eﬃciency measure results in only a small rise
in Þnal output. The substitution eﬀect will be small because the gap between the productivity
of the lucky (unlucky) intermediate Þrm and that of other intermediate Þrms diminishes fast
when output increases (decreases). Equivalently, strong diminishing returns to intermediates
imply a low degree of competition between intermediate Þrms. However, when returns to
intermediates are constant, then substitution eﬀects will be inÞnitely large, competition will
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be perfect, and only one intermediate will be produced. The returns to intermediate inputs
thus determine whether the relation between Þnal output and eﬃciency measures is concave or
convex.
The eﬀects of competition and decreasing returns to intermediates can be separated by
decomposition of equation 1 into a Cobb-Douglas function with eﬀective capital (Ke) as a third
factor and a CES aggregate of intermediate products that deÞnes Ke11
Y = L1−α−βHβYK
α
e
Ke ≡
µZ A
0
(θixi)
α di
¶ 1
α
.
The optimal composition of eﬀective capital can be derived by maximizing Ke with respect
to the xi and subject to a budget constraint:
max
xi
L =
µZ A
0
(θixi)
α di
¶ 1
α
+ λ
µ
K0 − r
Z A
0
ηixidi
¶
.
The elasticities of substitution for changes in θ and η are
σxθ ≡ d (xi/xj)
d (θi/θj)
(θi/θj)
(xi/xj)
=
−α
α− 1
σxη ≡ d (xi/xj)
d
¡
ηi/ηj
¢ ¡ηi/ηj¢
(xi/xj)
=
1
α− 1 ,
implying that
α = 0 α = 1/2 α ↑ 1
σxθ 0 1 ∞
σxη −1 −2 −∞
More competition between intermediate producers magniÞes the impact of a change in quality
or costs. Equation 13 conÞrms this result. Stronger competition in the intermediate sector
increases the convexity (or reduces the concavity) of xi (θi, ηi), thereby making the eﬀects of
uncertainty on the expected value of xi more positive (less negative). Note that for α = 1/2
the function xi (θi, ηi) is linear in θi, and that as, a consequence, the level of uncertainty does
not aﬀect the expected value of xi.
In order to consider the contribution of an intermediate product to Þnal output, one also has
to consider the decreasing returns to intermediates. Ignoring competition in product markets,
this contribution can be deÞned as
Yi ≡ L1−α−βHβY
µ
θi
Ki
ηi
¶α
.
11This approach has also been followed by Zon, Meijers, and Yetkiner (1999).
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Decreasing returns to intermediates cause Yi (θi, ηi) to be concave in θi and, consequently, the
relation between uncertainty and the expected value of Yi will be negative. Decreasing returns
to intermediates also reduce the convexity of Yi (θi, ηi) in ηi.
The combined eﬀects of both competition and decreasing returns to intermediates are made
visible by equation 15. The equilibrium contribution of an intermediate product to Þnal output
is
Yi = H
α+β−1
α−1
Y L
−β
α−1 r
α
α−1 (1− α− β)−2αα−1 θ
−α
α−1
i η
α
α−1
i .
The corresponding substitution elasticities are
σY θ ≡ d (Yi/Yj)
d (θi/θj)
(θi/θj)
(Yi/Yj)
=
−α
α− 1 = k
σY η ≡ d (Yi/Yj)
d
¡
ηi/ηj
¢ ¡ηi/ηj¢
(Yi/Yj)
=
α
α− 1 = −k ,
and thus
α = 0 α = 1/2 α ↑ 1
σY θ 0 1 ∞
σY η 0 −1 −∞
Taking account of both competition and decreasing returns to intermediate input eﬀects, it can
be concluded that the total Jensens Inequality eﬀect is negative for θ if α < 1/2, positive for
θ if α > 1/2, and positive for η for all α.
Recalling that
κ ≡ kmθ + 1
2
k (k − 1) σ2θ − kmη +
1
2
k (k + 1) σ2η − k22σθσηµ ,
we see that κ comprises the eﬀects of changes in the mean and variance of θ and η on Y . The
Þrst order (mean) eﬀects, kmθ and −kmη, are due to the drift of θ and η. The second order
(variance) eﬀects, 1
2
k (k − 1)σ2θ, 12k (k + 1)σ2η, and −k22σθσηµ are due to Jensens Inequality.12
Second order eﬀects change the growth rate of Y because of the growth in the variance of the
cost and quality characteristics of Þrms that results from micro-uncertainty.
Competition in the intermediate sector leads to a continuous reallocation of capital goods.
This reallocation of capital, which might in practice take the form of sales, mergers, and ac-
quisitions, leads to a more productive use of capital. This, in turn, increases the demand for
capital. Besides competition, two conditions are important for the occurrence of reallocation
of capital. First, capital has to be ßexible. Would reallocation of capital be impossible or very
costly, then this would Þx the output levels of intermediate Þrms and prohibit substitution.
12Algebraically, κ is the result of the application of Itôs lemma to equation 15 (see subsection A.1). An
intuitive explanation of the relation between Itôs lemma and Jensens Ineqality starts by considering that
applying Itôs lemma is identical to making a linear approximation to the increments of a function of a stochastic
variable. This is equivalent to computing the expected increments of that function. Therefore, the second-order
eﬀects are due to Jensens Inequality.
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Second, diversity is required for substitution. This is why micro-uncertainty is less harmful
than aggregate uncertainty. In case of aggregate uncertainty, theres either an abundance or
shortage of resources. With micro-uncertainty and some costless ßexibility, resources can be
used more productively.
Another consequence of micro-uncertainty concerns the distribution of the size of intermedi-
ate Þrms. The size of intermediate Þrm i is a function of θi and ηi (equation 13). The size of an
intermediate Þrm follows a geometric Brownian motion with normally distributed increments
because θi and ηi do. Therefore, the size of intermediate Þrms will be lognormally distributed.
As the variance of the distribution of θi and ηi keeps on growing over time, so will the variance
of the distribution of Þrm size. The intermediate sector will be characterized by increasing
numbers of very small and very big Þrms.13
6.2 The market for human capital
Consider the eﬀect of σθ and ση on the market for human capital. How does the growth of the
variance of θ and η, caused by uncertainty, aﬀect the growth of the number of intermediates?
An increase in the variance of θ or η changes the price of new designs for three reasons. First,
depending on the intermediate input substitution eﬀect, a larger variance may give rise to higher
expected proÞts, and thus the expected value of a new design will also be higher. Second, a larger
variance will cause the gap between the value of the design and its actual price to widen via the
real-option eﬀect (this is where b1 comes in). Third, a higher variance causes the productivity
of aggregate capital to change, and savings and interest rates will adjust accordingly. A higher
interest rate will reduce the present value of designs, while a lower interest rate will lead to a
higher value.
A change in the price of a design will change the productivity of human capital in the
research sector. If the productivity of human capital in the research sector grows at a higher
rate than the productivity of human capital in the Þnal goods sector, then human capital will
start shifting towards the research sector until the gap between the growth rates of productivity
has disappeared.
That the share of human capital in the research sector is constant if the market for human
capital is in equilibrium, is ensured by the following mechanism. Acceleration of the production
of intermediate designs, induced by an arbitrary shift of human capital, will cause an acceler-
ation in the demand for capital needed to produce the new intermediate goods and to Þnance
the purchase of designs. Acceleration in the demand for capital will cause the rate of interest
to grow. A rise in the interest rate causes the price of designs to drop, which leads to the
movement of human capital in the opposite direction. From equation 36 it can be seen that
the interest rate has to be constant if the market for human capital is to stay in equilibrium.
Equation 35 in turn shows that a constant interest rate implies a Þxed allocation of human
capital.
13There might be convergence in the distributions of Þrm characteristics and size if it is assumed that unlucky
try to imitate lucky Þrms.
18
6.3 Uncertainty and growth
The exact derivation of the relations between σθ and γ and between ση and γ, can be found
in appendix B. A summary of the impact of uncertainty on economic growth can be found in
tables 1 and 2. From the Þrst rows of tables 1 and 2 (Jensens Inequality), it can be seen that
the direct eﬀects of σθ and ση on γ have the same sign as their eﬀects on Y when keeping A
constant (equation 18). This is to be expected: a more (less) eﬃcient Þnal goods sector should
lead to faster (slower) growth.
The second rows of tables 1 and 2 indicate that if the autonomous growth rate of Þnal sector
output, κ, is high, uncertainty stimulates growth through an increase in the investment-timing
eﬀect. This is a somewhat puzzling result as a larger investment-timing eﬀect implies a decrease
in the productivity of the research sector. The key to this paradox lies in the observation that
employing more human capital in the research sector does not necessarily result in a higher long-
term growth rate of Þnal output. If κ > ρ+sλδH
1−s , human capital employed in the Þnal output
sector will be more productive in the long term than human capital employed in the research
sector will be. Therefore, a larger gap between the price of a design and its value, induced by
more uncertainty, will actually stimulate economic growth by increasing the share of human
capital that is employed in the Þnal goods sector. This leads to the interesting conclusion that
research can be detrimental to growth.
The third rows of tables 1 and 2 are about the interaction of the J.I.-eﬀect and the
investment-timing eﬀect (the eﬀect of κ on b1). As the expected value of a design is grow-
ing at rate κ, a higher κ makes postponing the purchase of a design more attractive. As a
result, the gap between the price of a design and its value will widen. A higher κ will reduce
the productivity of the research sector through the investment-timing eﬀect.
To get a clearer view on the eﬀects of uncertainty, we may adjust the values of mθ and mη
in such a way that some eﬀects are neutralized. For example, J.I.-eﬀects can be neutralized by
setting κ to zero through deÞning mθ ≡ −12 (k − 1) σ2θ, mη ≡ 12 (k + 1)σ2η, and µ = 0. When
κ = 0 by construction, tables 1 and 2 show that an increases in either σθ or ση will lead to
a slow-down in economic growth. The reason is that the demand for designs is reduced as
entrepreneurs see the value of their option to postpone investment increase.
7 Micro-uncertainty and economic policy
Can governments stimulate growth by inßuencing micro-uncertainty? The relations between
uncertainty and growth that have been found in this model, do not imply that governments
can stimulate growth by simply adjusting the level of uncertainty. It is important to realize
that trying to inßuence uncertainty will in practise involve a change in the a priori bias of
uncertainty. For example, a policy eﬀectively aimed at protecting property rights reduces the
risk of property being stolen or destroyed. As theft and destruction (whether it is expected, or
not) generally lead to losses in eﬃciency, enforcing property rights results in higher eﬃciency
and less uncertainty at the same time. In this case, reduction of uncertainty stimulates growth in
a trivial way. As a counterexample, governments that try to reduce uncertainty by obstructing
innovation should not be surprised to end up with slow economic growth.
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Table 1: Growth (γ) and uncertainty in quality (σθ)
κ > ρ+sλδH
1−s κ <
ρ+sλδH
1−s
α < 1
2
α > 1
2
α < 1
2
α > 1
2
Jensens Inequality³
∂γ
∂κ
∂κ
∂σθ
´ − + − +
Timing³
∂γ
∂b1
∂b1
∂σθ
´
+ + − −
Interaction³
∂γ
∂b1
∂b1
∂κ
∂κ
∂σθ
´ − + + −
Total +/− + +/− +/−
Note: µ= 0
Table 2: Growth (γ) and uncertainty in costs (ση)
κ > ρ+sλδH
1−s κ <
ρ+sλδH
1−s
Jensens Inequality
³
∂γ
∂κ
∂κ
∂ση
´
+ +
Timing
³
∂γ
∂b1
∂b1
∂ση
´
+ −
Interaction
³
∂γ
∂b1
∂b1
∂κ
∂κ
∂ση
´
+ −
Total + +/−
Note: µ= 0
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If a policy would be eﬀective in altering a priori unbiased uncertainty, then it would still
be diﬃcult to evaluate its eﬀectiveness in stimulating economic growth. In a real economy
the number of non-linear relations at the micro-level is too large to be sure about the kind of
eﬀect such a policy might have. Therefore, policies aimed at reducing uncertainty with a bias
toward ineﬃciency and policies aimed at stimulating uncertainty with a bias toward eﬃciency
are more likely to be successful than policies that have the objective to reduce a priori neutral
uncertainty.
Finally, the results presented in this paper suggest that long-term growth can be stimulated
by promoting both diversity and competition.
8 Concluding remarks
A model has been presented in which micro-level uncertainty inßuences long-term economic
growth. In part, this result stems from the fact that uncertainty can be biased. Furthermore,
this bias can be both endogenous and exogenous to the model. Diminishing returns to inter-
mediate inputs and competition in the intermediate sector are the sources of endogenous bias
in the model. Micro-uncertainty leads to growth in the variance of the quality and cost charac-
teristics of Þrms. This growing heterogeneity, in turn, stimulates the production of Þnal goods
because less eﬃcient intermediates are partly substituted with more eﬃcient intermediates.
Besides through being biased, uncertainty may also aﬀect economic growth through investment-
timing (real-option) eﬀects. Empirical studies suggest that such eﬀects are important when
investment are irreversible as is the case for research expenditure. Economic growth may slow
down when research expenditure is postponed in reaction to more uncertainty. Furthermore,
the endogenous bias of uncertainty may amplify or reduce timing eﬀects.
The model demonstrates that the implications of uncertainty for economic growth are prob-
ably much larger than they appear to be from aggregate empirical studies for two reasons. First,
the model shows that Þrm-level volatility is important even if it cancels out in the aggregate.
Empirical studies that use aggregate measures of volatility thus underestimate the importance
of uncertainty. Second, the model shows that uncertainty can have several eﬀects on economic
growth, possibly working in diﬀerent directions. By not separating these diﬀerent eﬀects, it
is not unexpected that empirical studies do not Þnd strong relations between volatility and
growth and that diﬀerent studies come up with diﬀerent results. For example, the positive
relation between volatility and growth found in the UK and US and the negative relation found
in panel data studies might be explained by the high degree of competition in the UK and US.
Also, uncertainty may drive a wedge between growth in Þnal output and growth in the variety
of inputs. It has been shown that research can be harmful for long-term economic growth for
some cases.
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A Proofs of propositions
A.1 Proposition 1
Proof. For notational convenience writeZ At
0
θki η
−k
i di =
Z At
0
gidi .
The process of Þnding a solution for
R At
0
gidi, consists of three steps. First, an expression for
dg has to be found. Second, the expected value of gi is derived. Third, it is shown that the
sum of the gi is a deterministic function.
1. An expression for dg can be obtained from the application of the generalized Itôs lemma14
dg =
∂g
∂θ
dθ +
1
2
∂2g
∂θ2
(dθ)2 +
∂g
∂η
dη +
1
2
∂2g
∂η2
(dη)2 +
∂g
∂θ∂η
dθ dη .
All terms involving higher orders of dt can safely be ignored (Itôs lemma).
dg = g

 kmθ + 12k (k − 1) σ2θ−kmη + 12k (k + 1) σ2η
−k22σθσηµ
 dt
+kσθdzθ − kσηdzη
 (45)
= g [κdt+ kσθdzθ − kσηdzη]
Here, the following multiplication rule is applied dzθ,itdzη,it = µdt. Equation 45 shows
that g follows an Itô process.
2. The value of g at time t = T is
gT = g0 +
Z T
0
dgt (46)
= g0 +
Z T
0
gtκdt+
Z T
0
gtkσθdzθ,t −
Z T
0
gtkσηdzη,t .
As gt is independent of both dzθ,t and dzη,t,¿Z T
0
gtkσθdzθ,t
À
=
¿Z T
0
gtkσηdzη,t
À
= 0
where the hooks denote expected value operators. The solution for the expected value of
46 is
hgT it=0 = g0 exp [κT ] . (47)
14A proof of Itôs lemma can be found in Malliaris and Brock (1982).
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3. First, consider the Þrms i ∈ [0, A0). These Þrms are all the Þrms that started at t = 0.
Because by assumption:
- the number of Þrms is inÞnite,
- all Þrms are identical at t = 0, (condition 1) and
- dza,it is independent of dzb,ju for a, b ∈ {η, θ} given that either i ∈ A/j or t 6= u,
the sum of all gi at time T is a deterministic function that equals the sum of the expected
values of giT 15Z A0
0
giTdi =
Z A0
0
g0 exp [κT ] di . (48)
Second, consider the Þrms j ∈ [At, At+dt). These Þrms are all the Þrms that started
between [t, t+ dt). The sum of the gj changes over time (T > t) according toZ At+dt
At
gjTdj =
Z At+dt
At
gAt exp [κ (T − t)] dj
= (At+dt −At) θkt η−kt exp [κ (T − t)]
= úAtθ
k
t η
−k
t exp [κ (T − t)] . (49)
Note that all Þrms started at the same time have identical initial values for η and θ
(condition 2).
Third, consider the Þrms i ∈ AT . The sum of the gi changes over time according toZ AT
0
giTdi =
Z A0
0
g0 exp [κT ] di+
Z T
0
úAtθ
k
t η
−k
t exp [κ (T − t)] dt .
This shows that
R AT
0
giTdi is deterministic for deterministic changes in A (condition 3).
Suppose the starting values of g for new Þrms are such that
πAt = π¯t =
1
A
Z A
0
Γgidi = Γg0 exp [κt]
(condition 2), and thus
gAt = g0 exp [κt] , (50)
15Suppose that Þrm ν (with 0 ≤ ν ≤ n) is appointed a fraction [iν , iν+1]of the domain of i ∈ [0,A] and that the
characteristics of Þrm ν depend on ιν ∈ [iν , iν+1], then the sum of g (ιν) over all n Þrms is
Pn
ν=0 g (ιν) (iν+1 − iν).
The limit of this sum for n →∞ is R A0 gidi. Also, as n →∞ the sum of g (ιν) converges in probability to the
sum of the expected values of the g (ιν).
plim
nX
ν=0
g (ιν) (iν+1 − iν) =
Z A
0
hgiidi .
The sum of the gi converges to the sum of the expected gi with probability one as n→∞.
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then the sum of the gj changes over time according toZ AT
0
giTdi =
Z A0
0
g0 exp [κT ] di+
Z T
0
úAtg0 exp [κt] exp [κ (T − t)] dt
=
Z A0
0
g0 exp [κT ] di+
Z T
0
úAtg0 exp [κT ] dt
= Atθ
k
0η
−k
0 exp [κT ] .
A.2 Proposition 2
Proof. In order to Þnd the SDE for V , the SDE for π has to be derived Þrst. An expression
for dπ can be found using Itôs lemma in a similar way as in equation 45
dπ = π

 kmθ + 12k (k − 1)σθ−kmη + 12k (k + 1)ση−k22σθσηµ
 dt
+kσθdzθ − kσηdzη
 (51)
= π (κdt+ kσθdzθ − kσηdzη) .
The expected proÞts at τ periods from t = 0 are
hπ (τ )it=0 = Γθk0η−k0 exp [κτ ] . (52)
The value of starting a new Þrm at time t is
Vt =
Z ∞
t
exp
µ
−
Z τ
t
r(s)ds
¶
π(τ )dτ
From equation 36 follows that the interest rate r is constant. Therefore, V becomes
Vt =
Z ∞
t
exp [−r(τ − t)]π(τ )dτ
The expected value of a design is
hVti = 1
r − κπt iﬀ r > κ (53)
The construction of the model ensures that r > κ.16
16Suppose that r approaches κ from above. Then ceteris paribus, the expected value of a design increases. This
will increase the productivity of human capital in research, causing a shift of human capital towards research.
As a consequence intermediate products become cheaper inputs relative to human capital. The increase in the
demand for intermediate products will induce a larger demand for physical capital, which will put increasingly
more upward pressure on the interest rate. Furthermore, a decline in the interest rate will stimulate the
introduction of new intermediate products. This will also cause the demand for capital to increase. Concluding,
in general equilibrium, the interest rate will always be higher than κ.
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Because 1
r−κ is constant, the expression for d hV i can simply be derived from equation 51:
d hV i = 1
r − κdπ (54)
= hV i (κdt+ kσθdzθ − kσηdzη) .
Combining 50 with 19 gives the initial proÞts of immediate implementation of a new design,
πA (t) = Γθ
k
0η
−k
0 exp [κt] . (55)
Using this with 53 yields the initial expected value of a design produced at time t,
hVA (t)i = 1
r − κΓθ
k
0η
−k
0 exp [κt] . (56)
A.3 Proposition 3
Proof. The optimization problem is
max
τ∗, PA
Z ∞
t
exp [−rτ ∗]PAf (τ ∗) dτ
τ∗ = τ
¯¯¯³
PA =
b1−1
b1
hVτi
´
,
with τ∗ ≥ t as the moment of transaction and f (τ ∗) as its pdf. The research sector has to set
a price that is expected to lead to the optimal waiting time / price combination. Substitution
of PA and Vτ (from 30 and 20 respectively) yields
max
τ∗
Z ∞
t
exp [−r (τ ∗ − t)] b1 − 1
b1
1
r − κΓθ
k
0η
−k
0 exp [κτ
∗] f (τ ∗) dτ
max
τ∗
Z ∞
t
exp [(κ− r) τ∗ + rt] b1 − 1
b1
1
r − κΓθ
k
0η
−k
0 f (τ
∗) dτ .
As κ− r < 0, the lower the mean of τ ∗ will be, the higher will be the revenues for the research
sector, irrespective of the particular form of the pdf f (τ∗). Consequently, the research sector
will sell as soon as possible, that is at τ ∗ = t.
A.4 Proposition 4
Proof. The cash-ßow gap (D) consists of the payments to the research sector minus the part
of the proÞts to which the research sector is entitled, plus the interest costs over the loan.17
Dt = D0 +
Z t
0
úAτPA,τdτ −
Z t
0
Aτ
b1−1
b1
πτdτ +
Z t
0
rDτdτ
= D0 +
Z t
0
³
b1−1
b1
¡
λδHA
r−κ − 1
¢´
Aτπτdτ +
Z t
0
rDτdτ .
17These interest costs are through the discounting of proÞts already accounted for in PA.
25
The second line is result of substitution of PA and úA. Diﬀerentiating with respect to time and
dividing by Dt yields the growth in the cash-ßow gap over time
Dt =
³
b1−1
b1
¡
λδHA
r−κ − 1
¢´
Atπt
Dt
+ r .
Is the long-term growth rate of D stable? To answer this question, consider the relative accel-
eration of the cash-ßow gap:
bDt = A+ κ− Dt .
Clearly the relative acceleration of D converges to zero, implying that Dt = A+ κ. Thus, both
terms of equation 40 grow at the same deterministic rate.
B Derivation of dγ
dσθ
and dγ
dση
The eﬀects of uncertainty on growth run through κ and b1 in the following manner:
dγ
dσθ
=
∂γ
∂κ
∂κ
∂σθ
+
∂γ
∂b1
∂b1
∂σθ
+
∂γ
∂b1
∂b1
∂κ
∂κ
∂σθ
(57)
dγ
dση
=
∂γ
∂κ
∂κ
∂ση
+
∂γ
∂b1
∂b1
∂ση
+
∂γ
∂b1
∂b1
∂κ
∂κ
∂ση
. (58)
Here, the Þrst term on the left hand side of equations 57 and 58 is the direct Jensens Inequality
(J.I.) eﬀect of uncertainty on growth, the second term is the direct timing eﬀect, and the third
term reßects the impact of the J.I.-eﬀect on the timing of investment.
What can be said about the signs of these three partial eﬀects of uncertainty on growth?
Consider Þrst the J.I.-eﬀect (term 1). Diﬀerentiation of 44 with respect to κ gives
∂γ
∂κ
=
b1
³
(1−α−β)
(1−α)α + 1
´
− 1
b1s
³
(1−α−β)
(1−α)α + 1
´
− 1
> 1 .
Next, consider the relation between κ and σθ given by 17. The Þrst term of 17 shows that if
α < 1
2
, an increase in the uncertainty parameter for quality (σθ) will reduce κ even if µ = 0. The
eﬀect of more uncertainty in costs (ση) on κ is clearly positive, at least for µ ≤ 0. Summarizing,
the sign of the direct J.I.-eﬀect is
∂γ
∂κ
∂κ
∂σθ
½
> 0 : α > 1
2
< 0 : α < 1
2
∂γ
∂κ
∂κ
∂ση
> 0 .
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The direct timing eﬀects are given by the second term of 57 and 58. Diﬀerentiation of 44
to b1 and setting the result equal to zero yields
0 = sλδH + (s− 1)κ+ ρ .
The sign of the relation between γ and b1 depends on the value of κ
∂γ
∂b1
(
> 0 : κ < ρ+sλδH
1−s
< 0 : κ > ρ+sλδH
1−s
.
The direct relations of b1 with both σθ and ση are negative as can be seen from 29. The direct
timing eﬀects are
∂γ
∂b1
∂b1
∂σθ
(
> 0 : κ > ρ+sλδH
1−s
< 0 : κ < ρ+sλδH
1−s
(59)
∂γ
∂b1
∂b1
∂ση
(
> 0 : κ > ρ+sλδH
1−s
< 0 : κ < ρ+sλδH
1−s
. (60)
Note that if κ = 0, that is, when J.I.-eﬀects are absent, the direct timing eﬀect on growth is
negative. Also note that contrary to what can be said of the direct J.I.-eﬀects, both types of
uncertainty have an identical impact on timing.
The third term of 57 and 58 represents the impact of J.I.-eﬀects on investment-timing. From
the partial derivative of b1 with respect to κ
∂b1
∂κ
=
−1 + κ ¡κ2 + 2k2 ¡σ2θ + σ2η − 2σθσηµ¢ r¢− 12
k2
¡
σ2θ + σ
2
η − 2σθσηµ
¢ ,
it is clear that the inßuence κ on b1 is negative as
κq
κ2 + 2k2
¡
σ2θ + σ
2
η − 2σθσηµ
¢
r
< 1 .
Therefore, the impact of uncertainty on growth that runs through both Jensens Inequality and
timing are
∂γ
∂b1
∂b1
∂κ
∂κ
∂σθ

> 0 :
½
κ > ρ+sλδH
1−s & α >
1
2
κ < ρ+sλδH
1−s & α <
1
2
< 0 :
½
κ > ρ+sλδH
1−s & α <
1
2
κ < ρ+sλδH
1−s & α >
1
2
∂γ
∂b1
∂b1
∂κ
∂κ
∂ση
(
> 0 : κ > ρ+sλδH
1−s
< 0 : κ < ρ+sλδH
1−s
.
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C Jensens Inequality
As discussed in the introduction, precautionary savings play an important role in the literature
on aggregate uncertainty and growth. If ßuctuations in the income of individuals can not be
insured, precautionary savings may also occur in a setting of micro-uncertainty. If this is the
case, uncertainty at the level of the consumer may lead to higher savings rates, and, when
capital and knowledge are related, it may even lead to higher long-term growth rates. In this
section it is proposed that uncertainty may also change the rate of economic growth in diﬀerent
ways.
Let us start with the general mechanism of which precautionary savings are a special case.
The key idea is that the magnitude of uncertainty in one variable is of importance for the
level of that variable or another one. First, consider the trivial case of biased uncertainty.
For a Þrm, running the risk of getting an extra order is not the same as running the risk of
a warehouse being destroyed by Þre. A decrease in the likelihood of Þre will certainly raise
the proÞtability of a Þrm, whereas a decrease in the likelihood of an extra order will not.
The probability of a favorable event can be diﬀerent from the probability of an event that has
negative consequences. A rise in uncertainty may change the mean of a variable if uncertainty is
biased. Second, whether uncertainty is biased or not may not only depend on the nature of the
events but also on the dimension in which it is measured. For example, there is no bias in the
outcome of tossing a (fair) coin. The probability of head is equal to that of tail. Now consider
that guessing the outcome correctly is rewarded with $100 while making a false prediction will
only cost $20. Accepting uncertainty (tossing the coin) is likely to be more proÞtable than not
accepting uncertainty (no tossing). The outcome measured in pecuniary terms is thus biased
while the probability of winning the bet is equal to that of losing it. In other words, the upside
of the risk dominates the downside of the risk. Formally, this phenomenon is described by
Jensens Inequality:18
If y is a function of the random variable x and ∀x : y00 (x) ≶ 0 then E (y (x)) ≶ y (E (x)).
This eﬀect is illustrated in the graph below. In the graph, y is a concave function of the
random variable x. The probability that x takes on the value x− is 1
2
. The probability that x
takes on the value x+ is also 1
2
. It is easy to see that y (E (x)) > E (y (x)). From the graph it
can also be seen that the magnitude of the diﬀerence between y (E (x)) and E (y (x)) depends
on three things. First, the diﬀerence will be larger if the function is more concave. Second,
the diﬀerence between y (E (x)) and E (y (x)) will be larger if the diﬀerence between x− and
x or between x+ and x is larger. Third, the probability of x− may be diﬀerent than that of
x+. Thus, the magnitude of the Jensens Inequality eﬀect will depend on the concavity (or
convexity) of y (x) and on the size and likelihood of deviations from the current value of x. If
the distribution of x is known, the last two eﬀects are summarized by the eﬀect of the variance
of x on Jensens Inequality.
How is uncertainty related to Jensens Inequality? There is a discussion about the meaning
of uncertainty. In particular, a distinction is made between Knightian uncertainty and risk.
Knightian uncertainty implies a total lack of knowledge about the future, whereas risk occurs in
18In economics, consequences of Jensens Inequality are commonly referred to as second-order eﬀects.
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Figure 1: Jensens Inequality
situations where all possible outcomes and their distribution are known in advance (a discussion
of Frank Knights precise categorization of uncertainty can be found in Runde 1998). The
problem with pure Knightian uncertainty is that its magnitude is unmeasurable. Would it be
measurable, then at least something would be known about the future. This does not imply that
Jensens Inequality is not relevant in case of Knightian uncertainty. Rather, the magnitude of
Jensens Inequality eﬀects would be unmeasurable. In a situation of pure risk the distribution of
outcomes is known in advance and the magnitude of Jensens Inequality eﬀect can be determined
precisely. In reality, individuals will normally be confronted with situations that are somewhere
in between the extreme cases of Knightian uncertainty and risk. Nearly always something will
be known about possible outcomes and some estimate of their probability can often be made.
The literature on uncertainty-aversion argues that the subjectivity of estimates of probability
may aﬀect the outcome of decisions. See Schmeidler (1989) for a discussion and Aizenman
(1997) for an application to economic development. Of course, subjective-probability eﬀects do
not make Jensens Inequality irrelevant.
The presence of nonlinear relations assures that (unbiased) randomness in one variable will
aﬀect the mean and higher moments of the distribution of other variables. As such, it is not
diﬃcult to think of uncertainty of some sort to be inßuencing the mean of any economic variable.
Without it being mentioned explicitly, a good amount of results in economics are special cases of
Jensens Inequality. The most famous application of Jensens Inequality in economics concerns,
without a doubt, expected utility. As utility is commonly assumed to be a concave function of
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lifetime consumption, expected utility is a declining function of the variance of consumption.19
Bernoulli (1954 (org. 1738), p.24) gave this example:
Somehow a very poor fellow obtains a lottery ticket that will yield with equal prob-
ability either nothing or twenty thousand ducats. Will this man evaluate his chance
of winning at ten thousand ducats? Would he not be ill-advised to sell this lottery
ticket for nine thousand ducats? To me it seems that the answer is in the negative.
On the other hand I am inclined to believe that a rich man would be ill-advised to
refuse to buy the lottery ticket for nine thousand ducats.
Depending on initial wealth and the interest rate, maximizing expected utility implies that
a constant level of consumption is to be preferred to a ßuctuating level of consumption, or vice
versa. Consumers either engage in precautionary savings in order to smooth their consumption
over time, or they consume immediately in order to hedge against an uncertain future. In the
model presented in section 4 consumers do not experience uncertainty and therefore neither
expected utility eﬀects nor, indeed, risk aversion of any kind is present.
Another special case of Jensens Inequality can be found in the literature on the ßexibility
- static-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ. Here, per unit costs are assumed to be a convex function of total
production. As a result, the degree of convexity determines how much average costs rise with an
increase in production ßuctuations. The ßexibility - static-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ is established by
postulating that minimum average costs are positively related to the convexity of the average
cost curve (e.g. Mills and Schumann 1985). Ramey and Ramey (1991) demonstrate a similar
mechanism in a general equilibrium context.
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